Natural Gas (under construction)

Gas pipelines require upfront investments, which, being ideosyncratic and sunk, create long-term mutual dependencis and large quasi rents. In this research program we analyze how the network topology and access rights determine the bargaining power of the involved players. We use solutions from cooperative game theory to investigate among others:
  • The effect of investment options and time horizont on bargaining power.
  • The impact of investments in strategic pipelines, such as Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco on the bargaining power.
  • Whether customers or outside producers benefit most from the liberalization of intra European pipelines.
To provide realistic answers to these questions, we use a quantitative, reasonably disaggregated model of the Eurasian gas-network.

documentation (pdf) describes the general procedure and files which are used to compute and store the results used in this and some other papers.
EAGas-Model (rar) contains code (mainly Mathematica notebooks and packages) used to represent the network, calibrate the model, calculate the value function etc.
Games-Tools (rar) contains code (mainly Mathematica some Matlab) used to calculate the solutions.

Pipeline Power: A Case Study of Strategic Network Investments
Franz Hubert & Onur Cobanli (2014)
Review of Network Economics, 14(2), pp. 75-110. (Published Online: 08/29/2016)

Network Access and Market Power
Franz Hubert & Ekaterina Orlova (2014)

Central Asian Gas in Eurasian Power Game
Onur Cobanli (2014)
Energy Policy, vol 68, pp. 348 - 370

Investment Options and Bargaining Power in the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas
Franz Hubert & Svetlana Ikonnikova (2011)
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol LIX, (1), pp. 85 -116